IndependenceThis blog represents the personal opinions of Wayne Hale only. It does not represent the opinions of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration or Special Aerospace Services, or their clients.
- Completing my circuit of the heartland I am leaving Colorado for Houston, home, and two days back in Mission Contro… twitter.com/i/web/status/1… 2 days ago
- Got to see it in person today! twitter.com/ruagspace/stat… 3 days ago
- Finding Meaning in Apollo waynehale.wordpress.com/2019/08/20/fin… 4 days ago
- On my way to N Alabama to talk space stuff. 5 days ago
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Tag Archives: Columbia Accident
From the Rogers Commission to reading Dr. Diane Vaughn’s book The Challenger Launch Decision took me 17 years. For all those years I had learned the wrong lesson about the loss of Challenger. The sound-bite explanation kept me in ignorance. … Continue reading
Starting the new job at KSC, I had set out from my home in Houston on January 30th, with the expectation of spending about three weeks on the job before getting a weekend back in Houston. Among the most surreal … Continue reading
Prior to the Challenger accident, the theory was that riding on the space shuttle was like riding on a modern jet airliner; passengers are not provided with parachutes and pressure suits. Challenger changed all that. With pressure suits, parachutes, and … Continue reading
One of the toughest problems the Ascent Flight Director faced was how to get the crew back home safely if the shuttle engines quit during the launch phase. We studied and worked out procedures and techniques for over thirty years. … Continue reading
First the official disclaimer: I can neither confirm nor deny that other national agencies might or might not have had capabilities that could have helped NASA during the last flight of Columbia. The fact of the matter is that in … Continue reading
During the accident investigation there were several efforts to determine what might have been done to save Columbia and her crew. None of the concepts to plug the hole in the wing would have worked; most would have caused even … Continue reading
Early on I decided that riding the NASA ‘corporate’ jet was not a real advantage. NASA had acquired a number of used Gulfstream II corporate jets to be converted to Shuttle Training Aircraft. Supposedly the Gulfstream people had upgraded to … Continue reading